Hugh Millen breaks down five plays in which the Seattle Seahawks stopped Minnesota running back Adrian Peterson for 3 yards or less, and details Doug Baldwin’s two touchdown receptions.

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The Seahawks probably aren’t 31 points better than the Minnesota Vikings, but they played nearly flawlessly. Yes, Minnesota’s three best defenders were out with injuries and Seattle benefited from a couple of awful calls by officials, but Seattle thrashed the league’s second-ranked defense and made quarterback Teddy Bridgewater look like an undrafted rookie up from the practice squad.

Most impressive, however, was the suffocation of Adrian Peterson, the league’s leading rusher who Sunday registered the third-lowest game of his career with just 18 yards on eight carries — with a long of 5. A successful play is commonly defined as 40 percent of needed yards on first down, 60 percent on second down and all the needed yards on third or fourth down. By that measure, Peterson had just two successful rushes — also third-worst in his career. A few thoughts on Peterson’s runs of 3 yards or less:

• Power play right for 3 yards: On its first scrimmage play, Minnesota aligned in a strong-right, offset-I formation, indicating a play termed Power that features inward down-blocking at the point of attack, with the backside guard pulling toward the playside. Teams often combine the down-blocking with the playside tight end blocking outward on the widest defender on the line. But the Vikings attempted to down-block with their tight end and leave their fullback on Bruce Irvin, who was the end man on the line. The fullback had farther to reach Irvin than a tight end, so Irvin reacted quickly to collapse the hole inside while Kam Chancellor “scraped” outside to deter a bounce. Also pivotal was a gamble by Seattle’s Ahtyba Rubin, who left his backside gap and flowed over the top to the playside. This left open the backside “B” gap, just inside the backside tackle. Peterson cut back inside, but the penetration prevented a more severe cutback to the open gap.

• Toss right for minus-1 yard: The Vikings had three tight ends to the right, rare on first-and-10. The scheme included a “G” block — the frontside guard pulling wide to kick out the cornerback, DeShawn Shead. The tight ends down-blocked to create favorable leverage, but Irvin established penetration through his assigned gap, just inside Kyle Rudolph. Peterson took the toss from Bridgewater and was deep enough to run behind and outside Rudolph. But the tailback, perhaps deterred from running wide by Seattle’s speed, mistakingly cut up and into Irvin.

• Flip-toss left for minus-1 yard: When the left guard pulled left to right, everything looked the same as the first power play to the right, but it was just window dressing in case the linebackers were keying on the pulling guard. Minnesota fooled no one. The Vikings expected unblocked right defensive end, the inexperienced Cassius Marsh, to collapse inside after reading the guard pulling away from him, but Marsh honored the backside. So did K.J. Wright, the weakside linebacker who, in theory, would flow strong and then be vulnerable to a seal block from the offensive left tackle. Instead Marsh, detecting a flip-toss to his side, sprinted sideways to out-leverage Peterson, while Wright evaded the would-be-block and filled from the inside. Also credit Frank Clark, the defensive end on the far side, for beating a double team and hustling to join Wright with inside pursuit.

• Counter left for 2 yards: Having tried inside zone-blocking runs to the right, Minnesota made one attempt at a gap-blocking counter for Peterson. The right guard pulled left to adequately kick out Seattle’s right end, Cliff Avril, whose primary run responsibility is to prevent the outside run. The offensive scheme then calls for fullback Zach Line, aligned right, to pull left with a lead block on Wright. Wright was athletic enough to evade the block, as was Bobby Wagner, who aggressively knifed under the combo block of left guard Brandon Fusco.

• Inside zone left for 2 yards: Before the snap, from a double-tight-end set, the Vikings had enough players to block inside zone left against Seattle’s eight-man front. At the snap, though, Rhett Ellison, the tight end to the left, ran behind the line to seal the defensive end on the opposite side. That could have set up counter runs, or bootleg passes, but in this case it left just three (center, left guard, left tackle) to block four defenders to that side. Marsh, Michael Bennett and Wright combined to deter both the bounce and the cutback, so Peterson pressed the point of attack. An unblocked Chancellor made the stuff.

Doug Baldwin’s two touchdown receptions: Both were from a concept called “All Go Special” — four straight vertical routes, with the slot moved to the other side to create a three-by-one formation. Baldwin, the inside of three receivers, ran an angled crossing route to stretch the free safety. The single-side receiver, Jermaine Kearse, ran a shallow cross instead of a Go route, influencing the Vikings’ inside linebacker and opening a small window for Baldwin. But Kearse’s route also freed up the cornerback over Kearse, Terrence Newman, to fall back into the play and present a converging zone defender on Baldwin — a situation ripe for an interception. Wilson had to beat Newman with exceptional timing. On the second Baldwin touchdown, it was again “All Go Special,” but against Cover Zero — an all-out, man-to-man blitz with no free safety. Lockett was the single-side receiver running the customary Go, but the key was Baldwin being covered by a strong safety, Antone Exum Jr. With no free safety, Wilson lofted the ball perfectly under duress, allowing Baldwin to employ a stutter-step release to create separation.