The Securities and Exchange Commission is investigating whether Boeing properly accounted for the costs and expected sales of two of its best known jetliners, according to people with knowledge of the matter.

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The Securities and Exchange Commission is investigating whether Boeing properly accounted for the costs and expected sales of two of its best known jetliners, according to people with knowledge of the matter.

The probe, which involves a whistleblower’s complaint, centers on projections Boeing made about the long-term profitability for the 787 Dreamliner and the 747-8 jumbo aircraft, said one of the people, who asked not to be named because the investigation isn’t public.

Both of the Everett-assembled planes are renowned for the technological advancements they introduced, as well as the development headaches they brought the company.

Underlying the SEC review is a financial-reporting method known as program accounting that allows Boeing to spread the enormous upfront costs of manufacturing planes over many years. While the SEC has broadly blessed its use in the aerospace industry, critics have said the system can give too much leeway to smooth earnings and obscure potential losses.

“We typically do not comment on media inquiries of this nature,” Boeing spokesman Chaz Bickers said in an emailed statement.

SEC spokesman John Nester declined to comment.

SEC enforcement officials have yet to reach any conclusions and could decide against bringing a case, said the people. The issues involved are complex, and there are few black-and-white rules governing how companies apply program accounting, one person said.

Boeing stock fell 11 percent to $103.69, its lowest intraday price in more than two years, before recovering somewhat to close at $108.45 down $7.91, or 6.8 percent.

Program accounting has been around for decades. It was first championed by the aerospace industry to address the problem that companies’ biggest expenses are amassed upfront, as they design planes and devise manufacturing processes.

Costs typically fall as the assembly becomes more efficient, making it cheaper to build the later jets than the earlier ones.

The method, which is fully compliant with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, lets companies average out the costs and anticipated profits over the duration of the “program” for a specific jet, a period that can last decades and encompass hundreds or even thousands of aircraft.

The expected costs and sales are estimates and they must be updated — and a loss recorded — when the program is determined to have reached a point where earnings won’t catch up to losses.

As part of the investigation, SEC enforcement attorneys are examining whether Boeing’s financial statements relied on sales forecasts that might be too optimistic, one person said.

Another avenue of inquiry is whether Boeing’s estimates for declining production costs will come to fruition, the person said.

A whistleblower gave SEC officials internal documents and data about Boeing’s accounting, according to the people. The tipster first raised concerns with the regulator more than a year ago, one person said. SEC policy is to not reveal the identities of whistleblowers.

Over the years, a handful of aerospace analysts have questioned whether Boeing will be able to recoup its costs for both the 787 and the latest 747, both of which debuted far behind schedule in 2011.

In general, the company has enjoyed a good reputation on Wall Street, earning billions in annual profits and winning buy recommendations from most researchers who follow the industry.

Boeing’s accounting projects that the company will eventually make money on the Dreamliner despite already spending $28.5 billion on inventory and manufacturing. The forecast hinges on Boeing selling about 1,300 planes and assumes profits on its later deliveries will offset high costs stemming from early production snarls.

Boeing told investors during a January conference call that its Dreamliner expenses would plateau this year, then begin to decline as it speeds up production.

“We still have work ahead of us on the 787,” Boeing Chief Executive Dennis Muilenburg said on the call. He added that the company is “focused on solid day-to-day execution and risk reduction, while improving long-term productivity and cash flow.”

Some analysts are skeptical that margins will improve enough to offset money Boeing has already poured into the 787.

Credit Suisse Group analyst Robert Spingarn, in a December report, made the working assumption that Boeing would fail to recoup 25 percent of an estimated $30 billion total in deferred 787 costs, leading to a $7.5 billion shortfall on the jet.

Spingarn said he expected any such shortfall would play out slowly over time, rather than in a single write-off.

Acknowledging a $7.5 billion shortfall would mean Boeing projecting future cash flow to be that much less than previously expected.

However, Spingarn and other analysts Thursday said the market has already taken account of a likely failure to fully recover 787 costs and that this is already reflected in the stock price.

Sam Pearlstein of Wells Fargo wrote in a note Thursday that “investors have been skeptical about [Boeing’s] ability to recoup all the deferred costs and so we think much of the risk is discounted in the stock.”

Boeing’s outlook for the latest and largest version of its jumbo family, known as the 747-8, has also been questioned by some aerospace analysts.

Over the years, Boeing has recorded several accounting losses, totaling $2.6 billion, for the 747-8 program. The most recent was last month, when the company reported an after-tax loss of $569 million and announced it would halve its production to six jumbos a year.

Boeing’s current accounting estimates for the program’s profitability rely on it selling 35 more 747-8s.

Meeting those numbers could be a challenge. The company has only had 121 orders for the jet since 2005, and most of those sales came before the 2008 financial crisis.

In addition, Boeing only netted two 747-8 sales over the previous two years. It ended up buying both planes itself as part of a lease-back deal with a Russian cargo company.

Boeing executives have said they are hopeful of a possible resurgence late this decade for the 747 freighter, whose size and cargo-loading capabilities are unmatched.

The company’s other sales prospects for the 747 include replacements for the Air Force One aircraft that ferry U.S. presidents.

Jason Gursky, senior aerospace and defense analyst with Citigroup, isn’t as optimistic.

“We expect the line to fully close early next decade after the Air Force One replacement,” Gursky wrote in a Jan. 22 report. He said the 747 order book is “very weak.”